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Abstract—The rapid expansion of cyberspace has greatly
facilitated the strategic shift of traditional crimes to on-
line platforms. This has included malicious actors, such as
extremist organisations, making use of online networks to
disseminate propaganda and incite violence through rad-
icalising individuals. In this article, we seek to advance
current research by exploring how supporters of extremist
organisations craft and disseminate their content, and how
posts from counter-extremism agencies compare to them.
In particular, this study will apply computational tech-
niques to analyse the narratives of various pro-extremist
and counter-extremist Twitter accounts, and investigate how
the psychological motivation behind the messages compares
between pro-ISIS and counter-extremism narratives. Our
findings show that pro-extremist accounts often use differ-
ent strategies to disseminate content (such as the types of
hashtags used) when compared to counter-extremist accounts
across different types of organisations, including accounts of
governments and NGOs. Through this study, we provide
unique insights into both extremist and counter-extremist
narratives on social media platforms. Furthermore, we define
several avenues for discussion regarding the extent to which
counter-messaging may be effective at diminishing the online
influence of extremist and other criminal organisations.
Index Terms—Cybercrime, online radicalisation, counter-
extremism, social media analysis, Twitter, cyber-criminals.
1. Introduction
The past few decades have demonstrated how the
Internet is playing an ever-increasing role in daily life,
and has become an integral asset in society. In partic-
ular, the use of various digital technologies and online
platforms for communication has been rapidly adopted
into the home and work place alike. However, this has
also introduced several implications as various malicious
actors, or cyber-criminals, are quickly exploiting both the
benefits afforded by such technologies as well as the
vulnerabilities presented by them for their own criminal
gains. Digital communities not only bring people closer
together but also, inadvertently, provide criminals with
new ways to access potential victims online. This has
included extremist organisations strategically shifting their
radicalisation and recruitment processes to online plat-
forms for the purpose of indoctrinating individuals [1].
The same technologies that allow for a globalised world
to interact seamlessly are also being utilised, adapted and
abused by extremist organisations to target individuals and
ensure organisational longevity [2].
Shifting to social media and online means of com-
munication has also provided the additional benefits of
granting extremists with a perceived sense of anonymity,
allowing access to an increased audience size, and utilising
interactive features provided by online platforms to facili-
tate the acts of like-minded individuals exchanging radical
thoughts [3]. One of the leading examples of an extremist
organisation making use of social media platforms for the
purpose of radicalisation is ISIS. ISIS’ early social media
strategies on Twitter emphasised several of the unique
characteristics of social media listed above. In many ways
ISIS’ highly energised recruitment efforts online and its
reliance on the Internet have been central to its identity
[4], in addition to introducing many initiatives from law
enforcement agencies to monitor and remove offensive
content online. The UK government specifically outlined
online hate crime, with particular emphasis on online
extremism, as one of the principal threats to cyber security
in their National Cyber Security Strategy [5]. Terrorist use
of the Internet has also been highlighted as one of the
primary forms of harmful and illegal content online in
their Online Harms Paper [6].
Although the development of legislative and policing
capabilities to prevent acts of extremism is clearly re-
quired, constructing approaches to reduce the radicalisa-
tion effects and impacts of extremist propaganda is also
crucial to counter them. Such approaches are referred to
as countering violent extremism (CVE), and have been
perceived by both researchers and policy makers alike to
being central to the process of addressing the pressing
need to combat radicalisation to violence and extremism
[7]. CVE programs have generally included carrying focus
groups and community engagement programs in particular
demographics to encourage discussion around identity and
social integration, and, specifically within the UK, the
teaching of fundamental British values to deter extremism
[8]. More recently, the use of the Internet as an aid in CVE
strategies has become increasingly apparent; for instance,
some of the work carried out by Moonshot CVE, a social
enterprise working to “disrupt and eventually end violent
extremism” [9], makes use of Internet capabilities to de-
velop counter-messaging campaigns and provide online
interventions to vulnerable individuals. These are intended
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to carry out counter-extremism interventions through the
same digital channels utilised by extremist groups, so as
to reach the same vulnerable audiences. As social media
becomes more present in daily life, CVE strategies must
also embrace the same technologies to effectively discredit
and nullify extremist groups [2].
Within the research landscape, several questions have
been raised regarding the evaluation of such online CVE
strategies, though very little has been carried out to ex-
plore how such initiatives compare against the content and
strategies used by extremist organisations. Some studies
have emphasised the influence that online messages can
have on human behaviours and opinions. For instance,
a study conducted by Frischlich et al. [10] shows how
people can be manipulated into agreeing with extremist
viewpoints when under conditions of threat propagated by
various media. Thus it can be assumed that online CVE
could influence opinions in a similar way, however further
research is required to strengthen this hypothesis.
In this article, we seek to advance current research by
computationally exploring both extremist content found
online, as well as the CVE strategy of counter-narratives
[4] designed to diminish the influence of extremist organi-
sations on social media platforms. Specifically, we engage
in a two part study that considers firstly, how extremists
and counter-extremist organisations craft content and sec-
ondly, how the psychological motivation behind the mes-
sages compares between them; thus, our contributions pro-
vide novel insight into both sides of online extremism. In
particular, this study will apply computational techniques
to analyse and compare the behaviour of various pro-
extremist and counter-extremist Twitter accounts, and the
effects this could have on influencing human behaviour.
Through this research, we hope to understand the extent to
which current CVE counter-extremist strategies on Twitter
relate to extremist content, and identify potential avenues
for future research on whether such CVE approaches can
be made more effective.
The remainder of the report will be structured as
follows. Section 2 will review the current literature on
extremist use of the Internet. Section 3 will provide a
detailed account of our approach and methodology, in-
cluding the datasets and data analysis tools that were used.
The results and observations from the analysis of both
the pro-ISIS tweets and the counter-extremism tweets will
be discussed in Section 4. We then conclude and outline
avenues for future work in Section 5.
2. Related Work
The phenomenon of radicalisation through online
platforms has been researched extensively over the
past decade by counter-terrorism and cyber security re-
searchers. Many previous studies have examined key nar-
ratives incorporated by ISIS, as well as some of the major
themes and components used within their online materials
for the purpose of recruiting and disseminating propa-
ganda. One such study is carried out by El-Badawy et al.
[11], which closely examines violent Jihadi propaganda in
order to understand their extremist ideology. The findings
from this study showed that common beliefs shared by a
majority of the global Muslim community, which may not
necessarily be extreme, are frequently used to form sol-
idarity with a wider target audience. Moreover, justifica-
tions from the Quran, Hadith or from scholarship are also
often used to resonate with their Muslim audience [11].
Similarly Torok [12] provides a qualitative analysis of the
social media accounts of a number of extremist groups; the
results from this study identify a number of key discursive
schemas, and highlight common themes used by various
extremist Islamist groups, including ‘blaming of the West,
unity of Islam, restoring the glory of Islam, and the
embracing of death’. These findings also reinforce the
observation that the unity of the wider Muslim commu-
nity is a key radicalisation mechanism used to normalise
extremist content and actions.
More similar to the research that will be covered in this
paper, numerous studies have made use of computational
approaches to analyse online extremist content and detect
radicalisation. One such study is detailed by Vergani and
Bliuc in [13], where computational text-analysis tools
were used to analyse the first 11 issues Dabiq to inves-
tigate the evolution of ISIS’ language. The results from
this provided four key findings: affiliation or achievement
plays a major role in motivating collective action of the
group; ISIS is increasingly adopting emotional tones to
increase influence, including anger and anxiety; ISIS texts
exhibit more concern for women; and finally, they are
making more use of Internet jargon to adapt itself to
online environments and appeal to younger audiences.
Another such study was conducted by Fernandez et al.
in [14], where they explored how online radical content
could be detected, not just by searching for key terms and
expressions associated with extremist discourse, but by
further analysing the contextual semantics of such terms
[15]. This provided a more realistic and reliable radicali-
sation detection model by helping to discriminate radical
content from content that only uses radical terminology,
i.e. content simply reporting on events or sharing harmless
religious rhetoric.
Despite the extensive research analysing online ex-
tremist content, to our knowledge, there have been few
carried out to systematically or computationally analyse
counter-extremism content currently existing online in a
similar way. This could largely be due to the fact that,
at present, there are few existing counter-extremism ini-
tiatives online, or at least few that exist on mainstream
social media platforms such as Twitter. That being said,
some of the work within this line of research includes
a report by Ashour, which outlined a broad framework
consisting of three major “pillars” that could be used to
counter extremists narratives [16]. The first pillar was
formed from a comprehensive message that dismantles
and counter-argues against every dimension of the extrem-
ist narrative, such as the theological and political aspects.
Secondly, choosing effective ‘messengers’, who could be
credible sources of information, namely former extremists
who have been successfully de-radicalised, would also
be imperative. Finally, the role of the media is essen-
tial to effectively disseminate counter-narrative content
and attract a wider audience is also imperative. More
recently, Wakeford and Smith [17] reinforce this point
by arguing that it is not enough to simply delegitimise
extremist posts; law enforcement agencies need to learn
from extremist organisations, investigate and understand
what makes them so influential, and harness this in their
own counter-extremism efforts
The research detailed in this paper will therefore aim
to fill the gap currently in this research landscape by
providing more extensive empirical and statistical insight
into the strategies used by pro-extremist users and how
extremist content is constructed online. In particular, our
work focuses on the extent to which the first and third pil-
lars described above are currently being used in counter-
extremist posts. We additionally bring some understanding
into the psychological motivation behind their posts. By
this, we specifically refer to how language can be ma-
nipulated to influence human behaviour. By comparing
these findings to the content shared by counter-extremism
agencies, we provide unique insight into both sides of
the problem, and also provide avenues for discussion
regarding the extent to which counter-messages may be
effective at diminishing the online influence of extremist
organisations.
3. Methodology
Our approach consists of analysing two datasets of
tweets—one consisting of tweets from pro-ISIS accounts
and the other consisting of tweets from counter-extremism
agencies—to gain insight into the linguistic components
used within them. We first use computational methods
to carry out an empirical analysis to better understand
the techniques used by pro-ISIS supporters and various
counter-extremism organisations to promote their content.
This will include comparing the usage of hashtags, links
to external websites, and the most commonly used terms.
Following this, we implement a more comprehensive lin-
guistic analysis of the different sets of tweets to gain
an understanding of how online narratives are framed.
Through applying insights from previous research regard-
ing the use of language and motivational theory (such as
Regulatory Focus theory introduced by Higgins in [18])
in certain texts, this analysis will allow us to further
explore how certain linguistic components can be used
to influence behavioural change. This will also provide
insight on whether online counter-narrative content can
be crafted more effectively, for instance, by utilising more
appropriate linguistic terms. Below, we describe the Twit-
ter datasets that are used in the study, and the methods
and tools used to analyse them.
3.1. Datasets
In order to analyse extremist content on social media,
we acquired a publicly available dataset of noticeably
pro-ISIS tweets posted by key ISIS-supporting Twitter
accounts1. The dataset was published by the Kaggle data
science community, and consists of over 17,000 English-
only tweets retrieved from 112 distinct pro-ISIS supporter
accounts over a period of three months during the after-
math of the November 2015 Paris terror attacks. These
tweets were identified as being pro-ISIS after analysing
specific indicators. This includes using certain key terms
within their username, Twitter bio, or the actual tweet
itself; following or being followed by other known radical
1. https://www.kaggle.com/fifthtribe/how-isis-uses-twitter/data
accounts; or utilising images of ISIS logos or well-known
radical leaders. This particular dataset has been used in
several previous studies, including [15] and [19]. Our
study focussed on English-only tweets as the counter-
extremist tweets used in this study were retrieved from
English-speaking organisations only—further details of
this are given below—making the analysis of the extremist
and counter-extremist tweets more comparable.
Before using this dataset in our analysis, we first
validated that these tweets were in fact posted by pro-
ISIS Twitter accounts by manually checking the profiles
of the 112 accounts using the Twitter API. Our assumption
here is that, if the account no longer exists on Twitter or,
in other words, has been blocked from the social media
platform, then the account most likely did belong to an
ISIS-supporting individual or group. This is due to the fact
that the suspension or blocking of an account suggests that
it had displayed malicious behaviour that did not comply
with the Twitter terms of service. From this, we identified
that only two of the Twitter accounts were not blocked
and still existed on the platform at the time this research
was conducted, where one of the accounts belonged to a
journalist, and the other belonged to a researcher focusing
on Jihadi groups. These two accounts and any tweets
posted by these accounts were thus deleted from the pro-
ISIS dataset, leaving a final total of 16,949 tweets from
110 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts.
In addition to the pro-ISIS dataset, we used the Twitter
API to retrieve a number of tweets from the Twitter
accounts of major, English-speaking organisations specif-
ically dealing with counter-extremism, including Gov-
ernments and Law Enforcement Agencies (GLEAs), and
NGOs. The accounts that tweets were retrieved from
belong to the following agencies: The Commission for
Countering Extremism in the UK (@CommissionCE);
Counter Terrorism Policing UK (@TerrorismPolice); the
UK Home Office (@ukhomeoffice); the US Department
of State Bureau of Counterterrorism (@StateDeptCT);
the Counter Extremism Project (@FightExtremism), an
international policy organisation; the Global Center on Co-
operative Security (@GlobalCtr), an international policy
organisation; and Tech Against Terrorism (@techvsterror-
ism), an NGO supporting tech industries. These accounts
were selected on the basis of the volume of tweets relevant
to counter-extremism that were available to retrieve.
Additionally, since the Twitter account of the UK
Home Office does not solely post counter-extremism con-
tent, the tweets retrieved from it were filtered with the
criteria that they include an extremism-related term (e.g.,
CVE, terrorism, extremist). To gain deeper insight into
how current counter narratives are constructed, we sepa-
rated this collection of counter-extremism tweets into three
further datasets: counter-extremism tweets from GLEAs
in the UK, counter-extremism tweets from GLEAs in the
US, and counter-extremism tweets from NGOs. Each of
these datasets held between 2,000 and 3,000 tweets (with
2481 tweets from UK GLEAs, 2703 tweets from US
GLEAs, and 2649 tweets from NGOs) and were anal-
ysed separately to investigate whether counter-narratives
are crafted differently in each of the three organisational
bodies. We then created a further dataset with the tweets
from all the above mentioned counter-extremism datasets
(with 7833 tweets in total) to easier compare the results
from extremist and counter-extremist posts.
Before analysing the datasets, a series of pre-
processing steps were carried out to clean the tweets
and prepare them for further linguistic analysis. These
steps included: (1) Removing any duplicate tweets or
retweets from the datasets to reduce the levels of noise. (2)
Removing all punctuation marks. (3) Removing any URLs
from tweets. Similar data cleaning methods were used by
[15] and [19] prior to working with the dataset. It should
also be noted here that account names and usernames were
not used throughout the duration of this analysis—only
the text used within the actual tweets were linguistically
analysed after the specified Twitter accounts were chosen
and organised into their appropriate sub-datasets.
3.2. Analysis Framework and Methodology
Our analysis of the extremist and counter-extremist
tweets is conducted with particular regards to two research
questions:
• RQ1: How are pro-extremist and counter-extremist
messages constituted and what do they focus on
promoting?
• RQ2: How do pro-extremist and counter-
extremism Twitter accounts compare in terms
of the methods used to disseminate content and
the psychological motivation used within their
tweets?
The initial empirical analysis will be used to examine
data associated with each dataset of tweets, including the
most commonly used hashtags and terms, and some of
the ‘topics’ that are associated with them. The results from
this will then be compared across all five datasets of tweets
to identify any similarities or differences between their
respective approaches to promoting their content. This
analysis will be carried out using the Pandas2 data anal-
ysis library and the ‘Natural Language Toolkit’ (NLTK)3
provided by the Python programming language.
To complement the aforementioned analysis, we use
a framework majorly based on the theory of utilising
regulatory focus to influence the thoughts and actions
of a target audience through motivational regulation. In
particular, this analysis is underpinned by the idea that
regulatory focus distinguishes between two types of moti-
vational regulation, promotion and prevention, as detailed
by Higgins [18]. Here, a promotion focus places emphasis
on desires and potential goals, and often views these goals
as hopes and aspirations [20]. In contrast, a prevention
focus places emphasis on potential losses, and tends to
view goals as duties and obligations [18].
Moreover, the findings of Fuglestad et al. [21] also
supported the notion that the regulatory focus and the
frame of a message could be highly relevant to behavioural
change, which they exemplified with smoking cessation
and weight-loss interventions. Their study showed that a
promotion focus could be related to the initiation of be-
havioural change (such as quitting smoking and dieting),
while a prevention focus predicted the long-term mainte-
nance of new, healthy behaviours. Some of these findings
2. https://pandas.pydata.org/
3. https://www.nltk.org/
were applied to our study to observe if either prevention
or promotion regulatory focus were used in the extremist
or counter-extremist message frames to radicalise or de-
radicalise target audiences respectively. This was assessed
using an analysis framework based on the findings from
Vaughn [22], which provided some statistical insight into
the linguistic components used in both prevention and
promotion regulatory focus.
To analyse the datasets of tweets, we used the pro-
grammatically coded dictionary from the Linguistic In-
quiry and Word Count (LIWC) linguistic analysis tool to
automate the process of extracting psychological meaning
from textual content. A similar approach has been used in
[22] and other studies to examine and predict the psycho-
logical frames and behaviours of various groups as well
as textual content, for instance, to predict depression [23].
LIWC is a widely used tool utilised in lexical approaches
for personality measurement, and statistically analyses
textual content based on 81 different categories by cal-
culating the percentage of words in the input text that
match predefined words in a given category. LIWC is used
in our approach to assess the extent to which each of the
datasets of tweets make use of promotion and prevention
regulatory focus, in accordance with an analysis frame-
work detailed by Vaughn in [22]. Here, Vaughn specifies
the LIWC categories that share significant differences
in promotion-focussed text and prevention-focussed text.
Further details of this have been provided in Section 4.2.
below. The next section will detail the results from our
analysis, and discuss the insights gained from this.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Empirical Analysis
4.1.1. Most Commonly Used Hashtags. Hashtags used
by the pro-ISIS Twitter accounts followed most of the
obvious political and extremist interests of radical Islamist
as well as ISIS-specific adherents. In all the 16,494 pro-
ISIS tweets, a total of 2418 distinct hashtags were de-
tected, where 41% of the tweets contained at least one
hashtag. The 15 most used hashtags found in the pro-
ISIS tweets—as well as those found in the other datasets
of tweets—are summarised in Table 1. The most popular
hashtags by a wide margin were #isis and #syria, which
were used 1577 and 1373 times respectively. Considering
the fact that most ISIS-related activity was based in Syria
and its surrounding areas, it is no surprise that a majority
of the most common hashtags were related to locations
where ISIS activity was most prevalent, including Iraq
and Aleppo, as well as the states which had the most
impact on ISIS activity—at the time of data collection—
including Russia and the USA. The consistent usage of
such hashtags helped amplify the coverage of ISIS-related
news amongst supporter networks.
The tweets from counter-extremism NGOs used a
total of 647 distinct hashtags (where 44% of the tweets
contained at least one hashtag), with the tweets from US
GLEAs using a similar number of 605 distinct hashtags
(where 57% of the tweets contained at least one hashtag).
However, the counter-extremism tweets from UK GLEAs
used considerably fewer distinct hashtags, as only 375
TABLE 1. THE 15 MOST USED HASHTAGS FOUND IN THE PRO-ISIS AND COUNTER-EXTREMISM TWEETS ARE SUMMARISED BELOW.
Pro-ISIS Supp. Counter-extremists NGOs US GLEAs UK GLEAs
#isis–1577 #actioncountersterrorism–826 #cve–160 #counterterrorism–163 #actioncountersterrorism–826
#syria–1373 #extremism–348 #isis–116 #isil–159 #extremism–304
#is–677 #cve–255 #pve–96 #terrorist–102 #stop–97
#iraq–634 #counterterrorism–238 #terrorism–84 #cve–95 #runhidetell–87
#islamicstate–443 #isis–181 #counterterrosim–74 #terrorism–94 #gunsoffourstreets–74
#aleppo–406 #terrorism–179 #gifct–58 #hizballah–78 #ctiru–67
#amaqagency–332 #isil–163 #techvsterrorism–58 #isis–65 #extremists–54
#breaking–324 #terrorist–135 #cft–54 #ct–65 #ath–51
#russia–271 #pve–97 #aml–53 #syria–57 #terrorists–47
#breakingnews–252 #stop–97 #radicalization–50 #gctf–51 #ctaw2016pic–47
#turkey–229 #runhidetell–87 #violentextremism–44 #bokoharam–50 #knowthegameplan–40
#usa–216 #ct–85 #extremism–39 #iraq–39 #illegalguns–35
#palmyra–215 #hizballah–78 #humanrights–37 #nigeria–37 #ctpolicingcareers–34
#ypg–199 #syria–77 #technology–37 #iran–22 #worldcup–23
#assad–159 #bokoharam–76 #un–31 #turkey–20 #besafebesound–19
unique hashtags were detected; however, we also found
that hashtags were use significantly more often, where
76% of the tweets contained at least one hashtag. This
suggests these tweets were more consistent with their
usage of hashtags to promote their content. In terms of
those which were most used, similar strategies were used
across all three counter-extremism datasets. As shown in
Table 1, the majority of the top hashtags used in the tweets
were based around counter-terrorism and extremism (e.g.,
#extremism, #cve, #terrorist, #counterterrorism).
A notable observation here is that the counter-
extremism tweets from both the NGOs dataset and the
US GLEAs dataset use the most similar hashtags, for
instance, both datasets frequently use hashtags related to
ISIS, including #isis, #isil and #syria. It should be noted
here that the difference between the use of such hashtags
by the pro-ISIS accounts and these counter-extremism
accounts are that pro-ISIS tweets would use these hashtags
to inform their audience of attacks and made by ISIS
and to promote their cause, as quoted in the follow-
ing tweet: “#ISIS claims control in outskirts of south-
#Ramadi - 25 and Commander of 6th Regiment killed”.
US GLEAs would use such hashtags to inform on the US
government’s strategies on dealing with ISIS, as shown in
the following tweet: “The US is dedicated to cutting off
#ISIL’s financing, disrupting its plots & stopping the flow
of #FTF’s. #CSISLive”. This suggests that a majority of
their counter-extremist policies were tailored to dealing
with ISIS, since this is the only extremist organisation
mentioned. NGOs would use hashtags relating to ISIS
largely to promote research analysing ISIS activities and
behaviours, for instance: “Successful terrorist operations
have shifted from a ’tactical bonus’ to ’strategic necessity’
for #ISIS, as ’online sphere has been tailored to facilitate
these attacks more”.
Contrastingly, the tweets from UK GLEAs did not
make frequent use of ISIS-related hashtags. Instead, the
most commonly used hashtags were concentrated around
informing audiences on how to report acts of terrorism,
including #actioncountersterrorism, #stop, #runhidetell,
and #knowthegameplan. Another noteworthy point is that
the top hashtags used by UK GLEAs were used more
consistently, compared to the tweets from the other two
datasets; the top hashtag in the UK dataset was used 826
times, which is considerably more that those used in the
NGOs and US datasets, where the top hashtags were used
160 and 163 times respectively.
4.1.2. Key Words and Topic Modelling. The next part of
the empirical analysis included determining which words
and topics were mentioned the most in each dataset of
tweets. The most used word in tweets from the pro-ISIS
accounts was ISIS, with Syria being the second most
common word. Along with the frequent mentioning of
Aleppo, Assad and Iraq, other common terms included
killed, army, breaking, soldiers and attack. Further details
of the most common words in each dataset are provided
in the word clouds in Figure 1. A topic model, using the
Non-Negative Matrix Factorization (NMF) topic detection
model, also provided useful insight into the most discussed
subjects amongst pro-ISIS users as well as key emerging
themes of ISIS ideologies, with the top 15 terms of each
topic being detailed in Table 2. We found that using the
Non-Negative Matrix Factorization (NMF) topic detection
model worked better with shorter texts, such as tweets,
than other models, like Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)
[24]. A large proportion of the most discussed topics
revolved around reporting the latest reports of attacks
against ISIS as well as those instigated by ISIS. This
includes Topic#1, which seems to include discussions on
Russia’s and Turkey’s involvement in ISIS territory in
Syria (as reported in [25] and [26]); as well as Topic#5,
seemingly discussing attacks from and on the US army
during ‘The Battle of Mosul’ (as reported in [27] and
[28]). Other topics heavily discussed the ‘fighters’ of ISIS
and their martyrdom, as well as prayers for ‘victory’ and
‘reward’ (Topic#2 and Topic#4), as shown in the following
tweet: “Fighting Khawarij is greatest Jehad, whoever is
killed by them receives the reward of a double martyr”.
The most common words used in the counter-
extremism tweets were similar across all three datasets,
with the words terrorism, extremism, and counterextrem-
ism being used most frequently in all sets of tweets.
The counter-extremism tweets from both NGOs and US
GLEAs also mentioned ISIS or ISIL on many occasions,
whereas such terms were not amongst the most common
words used by UK GLEAs. Tweets from UK GLEAs con-
sistently made use of words relating to reporting extremist
incidents including report, police, suspicious and action-
countersterrorism. In contrast, the tweets from NGOs and
US GLEAs focussed more on informing about terrorist
incidents and counter-extremism initiatives.
Figure 1. Word clouds of most commonly used words in each dataset: pro-ISIS tweets (top-left), NGOs tweets (top-right), US GLEAs tweets
(bottom-left), and UK GLEAs tweets (bottom-right).
The topic model provided further insight into what
content the counter-extremism tweets promoted in each of
the three datasets. Again, tweets from both the NGOs and
US GLEAs discussed similar topics. The majority of these
topics were focussed on new counter extremism efforts
and policies, and reports of threats in various countries.
Additionally, both sets of tweets discuss the activities of
specific terrorist organisations, namely ISIS or ISIL, and
strategies to counter them. The tweets from NGOs also
mentioned white supremacists and their online presence,
referring to other groups of extremists aside from radical
Islamist organisations. Aside from this, NGOs would often
promote workshops or events organised to discuss and
promote counter-terrorism strategies and policies, hence,
one of their frequently discussed topics was to promote
tickets for such events, specifically Topic#1 and Topic#5.
The tweets from US GLEAs would also refer to the US
government and their response to terrorist incidents, as
seen in Topic#4 and Topic#5.
In contrast, a huge majority of the counter-extremism
tweets from UK GLEAs were concentrated around pro-
viding advice on how to respond to terrorist incidents as
well as promoting the appropriate channels for reporting
such incidents. In this way, the tweets were addressed
to an audience from a more specific demographic, i.e.,
UK residents who could report incidents to appropriate
law enforcement departments within the UK. Moreover,
tweets from this dataset also promoted campaigns against
violent crimes in general, such as gun and knife crime
in Topic#2, and did not refer to any specific form of
extremism or organisation, for instance: “our advice to
the public on what do if caught in a gun or knife terror
attack. It could keep you, your friends and family safe #Ac-
tionCountersTerrorism”. Such tweets were often posted
multiple times, showing that UK GLEAs often repeated
tweets to emphasise its importance to their target audience.
4.2. LIWC Analysis
4.2.1. Exploring Motivational Theory. Although there
are 81 categories in the LIWC standard dictionary, only
the categories that were proven in [22] to indicate the use
of a regulatory focus were used in our analysis framework,
though some observations were also made for LIWC
categories which showed notable differences between the
datasets. Table 3 summarises the results from the LIWC
analysis whilst assessing the extent to which a promotion
or prevention focus were used. The table shows the mean
percentage of all the words used within the tweets that
fall into a particular LIWC category. For instance, a mean
percentage of 1.35 for positive emotion words implies that
1.35% of the words used within the respective dataset
were associated with positive emotion. Example words of
each LIWC category are also included in the table.
TABLE 2. A TOPIC MODEL OF THE MOST DISCUSSED TOPICS IN EACH DATASET.
Pro-ISIS Supporters Counter-extremists NGOs US GLEAs UK GLEAs
Topic#1 kill, soldier, today,
airstrike, civilian,
militant, wound, injure,
bomb, Russian,
children, yesterday,
Turkish, dozen, Iraqi
Twitter, follow, status,
find, visit, ISIS, use,
social, media, discuss,
internet, join, event,
launch, watch
status, discuss,
workshop, role,
present, panel,
participate, event, join,
host, policies, brief,
look, secure, first
icymi, yesterday,
remark, ISIL, video,
testimonies, destroy,
strategies, coordinate,
global, discuss, effort,
envoy, countries,
statement
extremist, content,
terrorist, see, online,
via, report, internet,
social, media, act,
remove, material,
access, combat
Topic#2 islam, state, fighter,
capture, force, via, unit,
fight, group, takfir,
declare, call, war,
muslim, martyredom
icymi, yesterday,
remark, ISIL, video,
testimonies, destroy,
strategies, coordinate,
global, discuss, effort,
envoy, countries,
statement
content, extremist,
online, platform,
facebook, media,
social, white, youtube,
group, nazi, video,
remove, supremacist,
hate
design, terrorist,
special, global, foreign,
organise, individual,
leader, yesterday,
announce, member,
entities, group, case,
today
run, hide, tell, attack,
safe, rare, advice,
knife, gun, keep,
simple, terror, prepare,
weapon, firearm
Topic#3 Al Qaeda, sheikh,
jabhat, leader, sham,
jaish, release, ibn,
jaysh, today, new,
village, airstrike,
Baghdadi, area
counter, terror,
extreme, violent,
police, UK, global,
effort, right, discuss,
prevent, support,
coordinate, threat, ct
attack, kill, people,
ISIS, bomb, Taliban,
claim, Afghanistan,
suicide, soldier, boko,
haram, target, group,
wound
read, latest, via, initial,
program, article,
policies, safe, remark,
foreign, counterterror,
recruit, prison, radical,
challenge
report, suspicious, act,
something, could,
behaviour, anonymous,
live, see, save, instinct,
ignore, online, public,
vigilant
Topic#4 Allah, may, accept,
brother, protect, one,
pleas, make, jazak,
victorious, Muslim,
sake, reward, love,
bless
report, online, see,
content, suspicious,
extremist, help, act,
via, terrorist, presence,
active, visit, behaviour,
find
report, new,
recommend, juvenile,
offend, policies, brief,
violent, effort,
rehabilitate, prevent,
develop, need,
societial, program
violent, counter,
extreme, effort, fact,
global, coalition,
summit, prevent, build,
support, extremist,
local, terror, partner
presence, help, online,
report, via, content,
step, find, visit, us,
button, speak, get,
advice, website
Topic#5 ISI, US, Assad, fight,
Muslim, support, rebel,
Syrian, Mosul, help,
want, group, back,
Aleppo, YPG
run, hide, tell, safe,
could, attack, rare,
remember, simple,
keep, knife, gun, terror,
watch, weapon
counter, terror, global,
extreme, forum,
violent, internet,
prevent, un, effort,
strategies, threat,
present, launch, nation
attack, terrorist,
condemn, statement,
us, honor, victim, kill,
remember, unit, bomb,
year, die, mark, ago,
families
game, secure, enjoy,
plan, weekend, great,
safe, time, address,
stay, go, stadium, look,
listen, check
Overall, counter-extremism tweets make use of a pro-
motion focus more than the pro-ISIS tweets. Counter-
extremism content tended to use the most language as-
sociated with positive emotion, which was specified as an
indicator for descriptions of pursuing hopes, and therefore
associated with a promotion focus. Similarly, counter-
extremism tweets made use of words related to work,
achievement and leisure more than pro-ISIS tweets, which
also indicated a stronger promotion focus. Further still,
such tweets from UK GLEAs had a stronger promotion fo-
cus than any of the other counter-extremism organisations.
The results from the LIWC analysis also clearly show that
the pro-ISIS tweets had a very small mean percentage for
the number of words used that were associated with any of
the four defining conditions for content with a promotion
focus. This suggests that extremists do not tend to frame
their messages around promotion, or view their goals as
hopes and aspirations.
When looking at the results for the prevention focus
section of the LIWC analysis, we can observe, inter-
estingly, that counter-extremism tweets posted by UK
GLEAs also made use of language associated with a
prevention focus more than any of the other sets of tweets.
The results for the UK GLEAs showed a greater mean per-
centage for almost all of the distinctive LIWC categories
indicating the strong use of prevention-focussed content.
Pennebaker’s findings in [29] found that, when compared
to descriptions of pursuing hopes, descriptions of pursuing
duties were more likely to include stories about dynamic
social interactions and processes. This also infers that a
higher percentage of function words including pronouns,
prepositions, auxiliary verbs, negations, and conjunctions
are used in the text, which can be observed from Table 3.
In addition to this, messages from a prevention focus
tend to focus on the avoidance of negative outcomes,
and because of this, often use more language associated
with negative emotions. The results show that UK GLEA
tweets had a higher percentage for this particular LIWC
category as well, supporting the observation that it made
use of a prevention focus the most compared to the
other datasets. On the other hand, the pro-ISIS tweets
generally seemed to use prevention-focussed narratives
less than counter-extremism tweets, and so did not put as
much emphasis on duties and obligations as the counter-
extremism tweets did.
Overall, the results from this linguistic analysis show
that the pro-ISIS tweets used much less regulatory fo-
cus, whether promotion or prevention, in their narratives
than the counter-extremism tweets. Further analysis would
therefore be required to assess their radicalisation tech-
niques. However, an observation that is common across
the results for all five datasets is that they all, gener-
ally, used a prevention focus in their messages than a
promotion focus. This could suggest that both extremist
and counter-extremist narratives view their goals more
as duties and obligations than hopes and aspirations.
Through knowledge gained from previous studies such
as [18] and [20], we can infer that using such a focus
could be useful to maintain behavioural change, though it
does not necessarily inspire initial behavioural change as
narratives from a promotion focus would do. Due to this,
it could be beneficial for online counter-extremism nar-
ratives to make use of more promotion-focussed content
and pursue positive end-states or goals in order to initiate
TABLE 3. RESULTS FROM THE LIWC ANALYSIS WHEN OBSERVING REGULATORY FOCUS.
LIWC Cat-
egories Examples Pro-ISIS Supporters Counter-extremists NGOs US GLEAs UK GLEAs
Promotion Focus
Positive
Emotion happy, pretty, good 1.35 2.46 2.24 2.22 3.78
Work work, class, boss 1.08 5.68 4.08 3.75 4.72
Achievement try, goal, win 0.97 1.69 2.04 2.50 2.23
Leisure house, TV, music 0.57 2.57 0.82 1.08 1.36
Prevention Focus
Function
words it, to, no, very 23.97 27.35 26.77 25.95 37.10
Pronouns I, them, itself 4.29 5.04 2.98 3.65 8.79
Personal
Pronouns I, them, her 2.61 2.88 1.54 2.06 5.14
Conjunctions but, whereas 2.06 3.11 2.67 2.30 4.51
Negations no, never, not 0.64 0.32 0.20 0.26 0.53
Negative
Emotion hate, worthless, enemy 2.63 3.60 3.60 3.70 4.08
Social Pro-
cesses talk, us, friend 4.95 9.24 5.78 5.53 11.14
Family mom, brother, cousin 0.24 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.11
Friends pal, buddy, coworker 0.06 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.17
de-radicalisation, although prevention-focussed narratives
would still be necessary to maintain these efforts.
4.2.2. Additional Observations. In addition to exploring
the usage of regulatory focus, LIWC was also used to anal-
yse each of the datasets for any other notable distinctions
in the linguistic composition of the tweets. Significant
observations have been summarised in Table 4. Whilst
conducting this analysis, an immediate distinction that
can be seen is the usage of pronouns in each dataset.
Overall, all of the counter-extremism datasets generally
used less singular first-person pronouns (such as I, me,
my), and more plural first-person pronouns (such as we,
our, us) than the pro-ISIS tweets. Second-person pronouns
(such as you, yours, yourself ) were present in the tweets
from UK GLEAs significantly more than any of the
other datasets of tweets. This is in line with the previ-
ous observations made from the empirical analysis where
the counter-extremism tweets from UK GLEAs mainly
addressed their audience directly to inform them of how
to properly report and protect against terrorist incidents.
When looking at third-person pronouns (such as she, he,
they), the results from the LIWC analysis show that they
were used more in the tweets from the pro-ISIS accounts
than any of the counter-extremism tweets.
The use of pronouns in speech and text has been
studied extensively in previous works, and has often been
identified as a discursive tool used to persuade audiences.
This effect of persuasion is partly due to the variability
of the scope of reference of the pronouns used, which
is determined by the audience, who can then interpret
whether they are inclusive or exclusive of them [30],
[31]. In particular, the use of personal pronouns such as
we, you, our and us is a common persuasive technique
used in writing to make audiences feel more immediately
involved. The LIWC analysis shows that this particular
strategy is used more in the counter-extremism tweets
than the pro-ISIS tweets; more specifically, the tweets
from the UK GLEAs used such pronouns significantly
more than the other sets of tweets. However, it should
be noted here that the pro-ISIS tweets used such second-
person pronouns (e.g. you, yours) more than the counter-
extremism tweets from NGOs and US GLEAs.
Another noteworthy point here is that making use of
third-person pronouns in political discourse is a tactic that
can be used to delineate the level of commitment and
involvement of an organisation to the statement being
made [32]. This is used most in the pro-ISIS tweets,
largely due to the fact that most of these tweets are
from pro-ISIS supporters, and likely not ISIS themselves,
though the counter-extremism tweets—especially those
from GLEAs—were directly from official representatives
of the organisations. This shows that, in general, the
counter-extremism agencies were more involved or com-
mitted to any future responsibilities declared in the tweets.
The results from the LIWC analysis also showed
significant differences in the use of language associated
with anxiety (e.g. nervous, afraid, tense). Generally, the
counter-extremism tweets used more anxiety-related lan-
guage than the pro-ISIS tweets from UK GLEAs using
such language the most, which is supported by the findings
from Vergani and Bliuc in [13]. The use of language
related to death (e.g. kill, bury, grave) was more common
in the pro-ISIS tweets, though this is justifiable consid-
ering our analysis showed that themes of martyrdom and
the attacks on ISIS, as well as the findings from Torok
in [12], were frequently discussed. Another observation
is that the pro-ISIS tweets used more religion-associated
language than the counter-extremism tweets. Tweets from
US GLEAs and NGOs referred to religion slightly more
than those from UK law GLEAs, though this could largely
be due to the fact that these datasets were shown to
discuss ISIS frequently, as noted earlier in Section 4.1.
Recent research, such as the study carried out by El-
Said in [33], has shown that a major de-radicalisation
strategy, particularly when countering ISIS narratives, is
to involve clerics and scholars to promote authentic re-
ligious teachings, and use them to refute misinformed
religious teachings propagated by extremists. This pro-
vides a further area of development for counter-extremism
campaigns on social media platforms, where making use
of such religious teachings could help to directly counter
TABLE 4. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS MADE FROM THE LIWC ANALYSIS.
LIWC Category Pro-ISIS Supporters Counter-extremists NGOs US GLEAs UK GLEAs
I 0.50 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.15
We 0.46 1.40 0.78 1.41 2.08
You 0.52 0.94 0.19 0.19 2.38
She/he 0.42 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.21
They 0.71 0.31 0.35 0.26 0.38
Anxiety 0.25 1.79 1.42 1.60 2.13
Religion 1.30 0.43 0.57 0.40 0.27
Death 0.85 0.25 0.40 0.27 0.07
a significant amount of extremist content online.
4.3. Limitations
Despite gaining some useful insights through this
study, certain limitations of our approach could have
impacted our observations. The first limitation that affects
any research carried out in counter-extremism is that it
is very difficult to ethically measure the effectiveness of
counter-extremism initiatives. This makes it challenging to
come to any concrete conclusions about how such counter-
narratives can be improved since there is no efficient
way to evaluate them (other than first hand experience
with individuals impacted). Additionally, measuring the
effect of online extremist or counter-extremist content on
behavioural change is also hard to do with ethically-sound
methodologies, and therefore can mainly be supported by
the findings from previous studies and research, as done
in this paper. However, since it is undeniable that online
extremists played a major role in the radicalisation of their
target audiences on mainstream social media, it should
be possible for counter-extremism narratives to reach the
same platforms as online extremists, and therefore dis-
tribute content that is accessible and influential among
their target audiences [34].
Another point to note about is that the counter-
extremism tweets were gathered from different time
frames than the pro-ISIS tweets. For instance, tweets
from UK GLEAs were collected from October 2016 to
September 2019, tweets from US GLEAs were collected
from March 2013 to September 2019, and tweets from
NGOs were collected from January 2015 to September
2019. This wide time span is largely due to the lack
of counter-extremism content available on Twitter (an
interesting observation in itself). In our study, we felt that
it was more important to gain a dataset of tweets large
enough to analyse and compare with the results of the
dataset of the pro-ISIS tweets (which were all from 2015
and 2016). It should be noted here, however, that most
of the counter-extremism accounts started posting more
frequently at around the same time the pro-ISIS tweets
were posted (in 2015 and 2016), which is when ISIS
supporters were more prevalent on Twitter [35].
5. Conclusions and Future Work
Up until recently, regulation of the internet against
organisational crime and extremism in online spaces has
mainly concentrated on disruption efforts. Ultimately, our
work suggests that perhaps other initiatives, such as CVE,
could be used to combat online radicalisation. From this
study, we sought to advance the current research in online
online extremism and counter-extremism narratives by
comparing the online behaviours of Twitter accounts from
both extremist and counter-extremist organisations, and
assessing how the two sets of messages compare with each
other. To our knowledge, this is the first work to explicitly
compare extremist and counter-extremist content in this
way, whilst also applying psychological motivational the-
ory to explore how such posts can influence behavioural
change in online audiences. Although our study analyses
data from one particular use-case of online radicalisation
through pro-ISIS tweets, we believe that a similar method-
ology could be applied to other use cases of radicalisation
using online platforms to gain further insights into the
effectiveness of counter-extremism strategies.
Through performing linguistic analysis on datasets
of tweets from pro-ISIS supporters and various counter-
extremism organisations, we found that, oftentimes,
counter-extremism tweets from certain agencies—namely
US GLEAs and NGOs—would promote topics and use
hashtags which were also used frequently by pro-ISIS
supporters. This included frequent discussion around ISIS
activity and use of the hashtag #ISIS. In contrast, counter-
extremism tweets from UK GLEAs seemed to share com-
pletely different content when compared to each of the
other datasets of tweets. In this case, the majority of their
posts were crafted for the purpose of informing online
audiences on how to report or protect themselves against
possible extremist activity, where specific extremist groups
were rarely referred to. Consequently, most of these posts
were not constructed to directly counter extremist content
being posted online.
In terms of the psychological motivation behind the
tweets, with specific regards to Regulatory Focus Theory,
we found that counter-extremism tweets generally seemed
to use regulatory focus more than the pro-ISIS tweets,
with tweets from UK GLEAs using such motivational
theory the most. An avenue for future work here would be
to analyse the pro-ISIS tweets with more advanced meth-
ods, frameworks or tools to assess any other radicalisation
techniques used by extremists to radicalise and manipulate
their audience. Our findings also showed that, overall, both
extremist and counter-extremist tweets used prevention-
focussed narratives more than promotion-focussed narra-
tives. An area for further study would therefore be to ex-
plore whether using more promotion-focussed narratives
would be an effective counter-extremism strategy.
Previous research conducted by Higgins in [18] sug-
gested that promotion-focussed narratives inspired ini-
tial behavioural change, whereas using a prevention fo-
cus could facilitate the maintenance of this behavioural
change. Thus, another hypothesis that may be worth in-
vestigating here would be whether the regulatory focus
of such online extremism and counter-extremism content
changed chronologically; did such narratives make use
of a promotion focus initially, and then shift to using a
prevention focus? Such theories could also be explored on
other online platforms, not just Twitter.
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